Abstract: Scholars both Chinese and foreign were, are, and will be studying central-local relations in China, but China still functions with problems. This paper reviews central-local relations in China and reveals that scholars have mistakenly named "central-local relations" when the proper classification is political and economic. Meanwhile, this paper shows that relations between the center and localities function like federalism with regard to the economy yet as a unitary state politicically. So, scholars study political and economic relations separately, and there will be two types of measures for central-local relations.
R
ereading does not mean that we can neglect the research scholars have done. I find that scholars who researched this topic before China's policies of reform and openness focused on China's long traditional history. These researchers are different from scholars who studied democracy after opening, and we can divide the history of research into two times, namely time of before reforming and opening and after. As the society and economy developed, two schools of research gradually developed to research central-local relations: "local" and "overseas." Scholars in the "local" perspective emphasize differences between China and western countries and seek to determine measures from China itself (e.g. China's special political institution, the socialist institution), China's long traditional history. Meanwhile, scholars with the "overseas" perspective interested in western democracy (e.g., federalism and division of powers) pointed out that China's political institutions, especially the Communist Institution, was a big hurdle on the way to developing central-local relations, thus, China would go further and benefit under the condition that China must learn from western countries by building up federalism and even democracy. Scholars of both local and overseas perspectives tried to define an effective theory to interpret situations of centrallocal relations in China and create useful measures to solve its problems. The differences between the two schools imply that there were two distinct times in the history of researching central-local relations.
Since 1949, the birth of the People's Republic of China, China had been brought into a new era, the Communist era. Because of political factors, China and it's political leader Mao Ze-dong insisted in classfighting. So, the Soviet Union was the only country that China learned from then in the world, and the political system of China was very similar with that of the Soviet Union. Many Chinese scholars believed that China's political institution including centrallocal relations was the best in the world and considered it as partly socialist. It followed, then that we should learn from the elder brother the Soviet Union. Therefore, scholars at this time believed that it was not necessary to learn from western countries to benefit China, and there would not be matters with central-local relations. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1990s, some observers (Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang) claimed that the decline of Beijing's ability to amass revenue was leading the country to follow Yugoslavia's fate and eventual breakup (1994a, 1994b) . I do not want to discuss why China as a unitary state still exists rather than tell readers that this time, scholars studying central-local relations just looked at China itself and determined that it needed opening. During this time, researching central-local relations was not based on sciences but politics.
Fortunately, since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, P. R. China has entered a new time of a "Reform and Open Door" policy. Therefore, another school of thought had arrived, namely, "overseas," which was influenced in a large part by western countries. A new science carried over from the western countries was Public Administration. And these "overseas" scholars studied central-local relations using modernized research methods such as institutional analysis and pluralist analysis according to rules of western sciences. From their research came governmental concepts characterized by decentralizing, separation or division of powers, and federalism. According to scholars of the overseas perspective, China's communist and socialist institution were at fault for the country's many problems and the only choice for China was to develop China's democracy. Chinese scholar Zheng Yong-nian, clearly pointed out that "in the long run, selective institutionalization of de facto federalism will lay an institutional foundation for China's de jure federalism," (Zheng2006). During this time, researching central-local relations functioned more and more like western science. In this paper, it will be called the scientizing period.
There is nothing wrong with new and advanced theories and thoughts. However, it does not mean that new and advanced theories and thoughts are suitable for us or our country. As Robelt A. Dahl, a wellknown expert of public administration said, "Generalizations derived from the operation of public administration in the environment of one nation-sate can not be universalized and applied to public administration in a different environment. A principle may be applicable in a different framework. But its applicability can be determined only after a study of that particular framework" (1947) . I agree that democracy, including division of powers, federalism, and so on, enables central-local relations in western countries to function well, but democracy cannot work well in China too. Meanwhile, another scholar Mengzhong Zhang in his paper pointed out that China was in a different developing stage from western countries, such as the US (2009). According to Dahl and Zhang, we must analyze new thoughts, theories, and the specificity of China and localize those concepts that have originated from overseas. Finally, we can determine which is suitable for us.
Re-realizing Central-Local Relations in China: Fundamental and Premise of Research
Every study has a question that serves as its foundation and logical starting point. So, it is necessary for us to understand the objects of central-local relations including structure, framework, and scope. In fact, there are many arguments on central-local relations now because of misunderstanding objects. For instance, some scholars ignoring political relations mistook economic relation between centers and localities as central-local relations, which in actuality is just a part of the latter. Some scholars excessively emphasized decentralization of power so that the center could not get enough compliance with laws and policies from local governments. And conversely, some scholars held a view of recentralizing power that disappointed and discouraged local governments. Mistakes were made by scholars because they fundamentally misunderstood central-local relations in China.
What are the Central-Local Relations?
Answering this question is not easy because the relations between the center and localities are very complex and include several different areas, for example, politics, government, economy, and power. Therefore, we must pay attention to all aspects of central-local relations when researching this topic. Unfortunately, scholars ignored that central-local relations were pluralist and just talked about one or two aspects of it so that there is not one research report that has studied central-local relations comprehensively. Basing on a literature review on central-local relations, I believed that central-local relations in China consisted of political relations including power relations and institutional relations and, today, economic relations. Within the framework of central-local relations, political relations are much more important than economic relations, but the latter have an effectiveness and influence on the former. And in practice, political reform in China occurs more commonly after economic reform as many scholars argue.
Political relations in China can be described as five different types: provinces, municipalities at provincial level, provincial level autonomous regions, special administrative regions, and one out-ofcontrol province, Taiwan (Lan, 2003) . Within China's political framework, there are not divisions of power between the center and local governments and a separation of power between the center and its branches. The power of nation had been centralized by the center, specifically The Political Bureau of China Communist Party, and in this perspective China is a unitary nation. However, according many scholars, China's economic development occurs faster and better than its political development and they called this the Chinese model of reform "economic reform without political reform." In short, local governments have little independence, power, and liberty, which is greatly different from localities in countries under federalism. Therefore, local governments must obey the center while the center makes political decisions. We call central-local relations in China in terms of politics "father and son;" the center is the father and the localities are the son. Central-local relations in field of politics satisfy the following conditions:
1. Within China's political framework, there is only one center and there are no division of power between central governments and sub-national governments and separation of powers between the center and its branches.
2. The central government has absolute power to make national policies and local governments must to implement the policies whether they want to or not.
3. Local governments have little independence and liberty to self-govern and may do so only after receiving permission from the center.
Therefore, we can conclude that China is a unitary state absolutely in the term of political relations between a central government and sub-national governments. Therefore it is not suitable to call the system of central-local relations in China federalism.
Comparatively, local governments, especially local governments at the county and township levels, have much more independence and liberty to govern and make policies both in law and practice, The local governments' scope and strength of independence and liberty are inverse with the level of governments because China is so large that the center cannot rule the local levels effectively. With regard to the economy, the center functions as a macro-control on the economy, which differs from local governments that implement national macro-policies made by the center. However, the local governments are not always obedient and compliant. The center receives obedience and compliance from localities only when the interests implied by national policies align with the localities' interests, but the center gets nothing when the local and center interests contradict. Then, localities will bargain with the center in order to protect their interests until there are agreements on how to distribute their benefit. There are also characters of central-local relations in terms of economy, for example:
1. There are divisions of power between central and provincial governments and provincial governments can make policies and take activities only with regard to the economy.
2. Provincial governments have more and more powers as well as responsibilities over the economy.
3. Local-level congresses have the right to make local laws and adjust their activities of implementing national laws and policies.
We can see from these characteristics that central-local relations in the term of politics are different from that in the term of economy, even conversely. According scholars of federalism, I call the system of central-local relations in China relative federalism.
How do Central-Local Relations Function?
Central-local relations function differently economically and politically, and it can be described as federalism with regard to the economy and a unitary state politically. Actually, understanding the differences in how central-local relations function economically and politically are key and important for researching this theme, and no matter who researches central-local relations in China, he or she must realize the context of it that determines successes of researches. But how can we describe the functioning mechanism and the context of central-local relations?
In field of politics, central-local relations in China described as absolutely unitary states have been formed by China's Constitution. Within the framework of central-local relations, the National People's Congress is the highest executive organ of State power, as well as the highest organ of State administration theoretically. The central government, namely, the State Council (the SC) called "Guo Wu Yuan" in Chinese is the highest administrative body with 27 ministerial-level ministers and commissions. Meanwhile, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate make up the justice system. In fact, because of China's Communist Party leadership, the highest decision-making body is the Political Bureau of the Party and this context of political power functioning results in economic and political differences of central-local relations. In theory, political interests of civilians are delivered by members of NPC who have been voted for this position every 5 years, then the NPC makes political interests become policies and laws.
However, since the situation of the leadership of the Communist Party, accesses of civilian's voices, and interests of decision-makers have changed, and committees of the National People's Congress of Political Consultation (NPCPC) also deliver political interests and voices to top leaders who make the final decisions. In some ways, committees of the NPCPC have abilities of numbers of NPC, and the NPCPC can influence decision-making of the NPC and affect executing policies.
In this sense, local governments are under the leadership of several national organizations: the State Council, the NPC, the NPCPC, and the supreme justice organizations including the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Actually, the final and absolute leader is the Communist Party, the Political Bureau of the Party. Therefore, central-local relations in China are not only between the central government (the State Council) but also other central organs , the NPC, the NPCPC, the supreme justice organizations, especially the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (the CCPCC) and local governments. So, scholars researching central-local relations in China should not neglect relations between localities and other central organizations, especially the relationship between localities and the Central Committee, which are an important part of central-local relations in China. We know that the Political Bureau of the CCP determines what will be discussed during every session of the NPC. Factually, the Political Bureau of the CCP is the real decision-making body, instead of the NPC. The procedure of making national decisions can be described as follows:
1. The top decision-maker is the Political Bureau of the CCP, and it makes national decisions directly or has permissions on national decisions indirectly.
2. The NPC, a theoretical top decision-maker, usually plays a role of handing down decisions that have been made by top leaders of the CCP legalities.
3. Another national political organization, the NPCPC, composed of non-Communist Parties, has the same political status as well as the NPC, the NC, even the CCPCC theoretically, and it functions as a consultant.
Based these characteristics, the relations between such central organs and localities can be illustrated as a flow chart (Figure 1) .
In the field of economy, central-local relations are different from that in field of politics. Theoretically, the central government makes national decisions which are implemented by local governments. Operationally, since there are local interests that always seem to contradict the interests of the center, local governments intentionally do not implement national policies well, even reject to implement national policies. Why are central-local relations so different between the same central and local governments? How do centrallocal relations in term of economy function?
First, the mechanism of decision-making is different from that in field of politics. Top decision-makers do not consultant with others, especially local governments, about national political affairs, but they must to hear arguments from the local governments, and even cater to localities, and that never occurs in field of politics. Actually, central and local governments play different roles in different fields. The center is an exclusive decision-maker and local governments are only executors of national political decisions. Conversely, the center and local governments both are decision-makers with executions of local governments with regard to the economy.
Secondly, whether the fiscal system functions well depends on whether the local governments comply with rules handed down by the center. Obviously, the fiscal system is crucial for one country just as one Hong Kong scholar, namely Shaoguang Wang said, "the finance is a lifeline of one country, and the state machinery can not work without revenues" (Wang, 1997) . The central government collects revenues depending on the state-tax system and the local governments depend on the local-tax system. At first sight, there is no link between central and local governments about revenues. In fact, the state-system functions well depending on local support because of people and companies who are taxed by the local governments, with the exception of some state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary for the central government to obtain support and compliance from the local governments so that it collects revenues successfully. As a result, localities receive numerous fiscal allocations from central governments every year, and it is the way in which the center obtains support and compliance from localities.
However, the center does not enjoy compliance and supports from localities all the time. Local governments oppose national policies only when national policies have damaged local interest strongly. Then, local governments will lobby powerful statesmen, even the top national decision-makers, to change national policies. If the lobbying was unsuccessful, local governments would bargain with central governments to reduce the loss of local interests. Finally, local governments destroy or refuse to implement national policies only when no agreement has been reached. In this sense, central-local relations can be depicted as relationships of inter-cooperation because that both central and coming out of local interests depends on cooperation of the center and localities.
As political relations between central and local governments are described in Figure 1, Figure 2 depicts economic relations between them another way.
This figure shows us that there are differences between political and economic relations between central and local organizations, and that central-local economic relations function more readily as federalism. As shown in Figure 2 , economic relations between the center and localities work intricately because there are bargains between the center and localities when national decisions are contradictory to local interests. And then, bargaining results in new national decisions or bad implementing. Within this figure, we can see that central-local relations in terms of economy are one-way when there is no conflict between the center and localities about interests, and it is two-way when there are conflicts between them about interest. But, central-local relations in terms of politics are one-way all the time.
Centralization (recentralization) or Decentralization?
There are two different schools of thought regarding central-local relations in China. One is the school of centralization of which theorists hold views that the center must centralize national powers or recentralize national powers that have been decentralized to localities in order to strengthen central authorities. The other is the school of decentralization, which states conversely that the center has centralized too many national powers so that localities have little space to work, and the center should decentralize national powers to localities more often. Actually, arguments about centralizations and decentralization, which initially appeared in the 1970s, never stop. As we know, China was called a totalitarian country in which the only party, namely the Chinese Communist Party had complete power and controlled the people during the Mao era. Many proponents criticized China's country system and its concept of decentralizing powers to provincial governments in order to motivate the localities. So, the aim of Deng Xiao-ping's strategy, called the policy of reforming and opening, was to decentralize national powers politically and economically. However, the prodemocracy movement of 1989 caused a national debate relating to decentralization among Chinese intellectuals and government officials. Opponents of decentralizing national powers, called nao-authoritarianism, focused on why power should be and how it could be centralized in the hands of the central government. Many argued that the decentralization initiated by Deng's reform since the late 1970s had led to the decline of central power; and as a consequence, the central government had lost its control over the provinces. Wang Shao-guang, a proponent of centralization, pointed out that promoting economic development generated enormous problems that had weakened central power. Wang and his collaborator, Hu Angang, justified efforts by the central government to recentralize the country's fiscal power in their book on the capacity of the Chinese state (Wang & Hu, 1993) .
However, arguments about decentralization and centralization is an inevitability of decentralization or centralization, and they both emphasized the inevitability of their own with neglecting that of the other. As a matter of fact, the inevitability of decentralization is built on the basis of excessive centralization, and vise-versa. So, it is important for scholars to determine whether national power is centralized or decentralized excessively before they give measures to decentralizing or centralizing national power. The fact of central-local relations in China is that national power of politics is centralized excessively and that of economy is decentralized excessively, so measures for central-local relations should be pluralist and classified. It is necessary to decentralize political power to provincial governments so that they have much more space, and vise-versa. In brief, measures for central-local relations in China can be depicted as centralizing economic power and decentralizing political power.
There are principles for centralization and decentralization:
1. Centralizing economic power does not mean to centralize all economic power from local governments to the center, and the condition under which centralizing economic power takes place is an excessive decentralization of economic power that has damaged economic development of localities. Then, the center must recentralize that economic power exercised by local governments from localities in hands of central governments. At the same time, economic power exercised well by local governments should be kept by localities. Meanwhile, there is the excessive centralization of economic power just like centralization in terms of decentralization. Certainly, only power centralized in hands of central governments can be decentralized to localities when they have disturbed national or local economic development. So, when we discuss centralizing (recentralizing) and decentralizing power, we must understand what need to be centralized (recentralize) or decentralized clearly.
2. The process of decentralizing power to localities from the center or centralizing power from localities to the center, is not completed at once but gradually. The power holder, whether it is the center or local governments, is reluctant to relinquish power to the other at first. So, there are usually many obstacles on the way of centralization or decentralization. There should be enough time for owners to adjust to new situations.
Conclusion Thoughts: Pluralism and Theory of Classification for Researches of Central-Local Relations in China
This paper has made an effort to review the situation of central-local relations in China and conduct a literature review on this theme for the purpose of finding a way out for reforming central-local relations, an issue China faces today. It has shown that China has never stopped reforming its central-local relations so that it could function well. Meanwhile, there are different subjects during different eras of reforming central-local relations. The subject of reforming centrallocal relations was decentralization from 1970s to the end of the 1980s, and the subject of that was centralization beginning from the 1990s. So, in academic circles, there are two different traditions of research: schools of centralization and decentralization. Certainly, schools of centralization and decentralizations all have been constant objects of criticisms of scholars since the concepts were first expressed. However, central-local relations do not function well according to how scholars wish it to work. Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to research central-local relations from new perspectives, just as what have been done in this paper.
First, do not simplify and classify central-local relations in China. To my mind, problems in the schools of decentralization and centralization have existed simply because the scholars simplified centrallocal relations in China. Scholars always describe China as a unitary country or de facto federalism simply (Zheng, 2006) . Actually, central-local relations in China are more complex than scholars admit and are quite different from relations in western unitary or federal countries. So, central-local relations can not be classified exactly as the unitary state or state of federalism. In fact, political relations between the center and localities in China are unitary completely, while economic relations between them are functioning more and more like federalism, an observation described by Yongnian Zheng, a scholar of China's political system (Zheng, 2006) . I initially classified central-local relations in China as political relations and economic relations, and then revised the concept to identify central-local relations in China as unitary in the political field and federalism in economic field.
Second, it is important to separately study political relations and economic relations between the center and localities. As we know, central-local relations are classified as economic and political, and relations between the center and localities in terms of politics and economy are different from each other completely. So, scholars interested in central-local relations must realize differences between economic and political relations because it is the foundation and premise of studying this topic correctly and exactly. Any scholars who confuse political and economic relations will fail to grasp realities and study centrallocal relations in China. In a word, what we use and have for studying political relations, such as assumptions, research methods, and even conclusions, are different from economic relations.
Third, countermeasures for problems of cen- 
